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Summary 
In today’s society it is hard to achieve scientific certainty on how our actions might affect the 
environment in the future. This causes problems in legal disputes, as a state must produce 
evidence of harm in order to stop potentially harmful activities. One way to get around this 
problem might be an application of the precautionary principle, which is examined in this 
essay. The basic definition of the precautionary principle, which most scholars agree with, is 
that the principle sets lower requirements on the scientific evidence needed to oblige a state 
to take action for the sake of the environment.  
 
The research questions used in this essay are firstly, whether the precautionary principle has 
reached the status of a legally binding principle in international environmental law, and 
secondly, what the principle in that case entails. Throughout the study case law along with 
different views in doctrine have been presented and examined in relation with the 
requirements for a principle to become customary international law.  
 
The main findings are that there has been reluctance by international courts and tribunals to 
apply the precautionary principle in case law, although parties in disputes have frequently 
invoked it. Moreover, the principle is present in a large number of multilateral environmental 
agreements further strengthening its place in international environmental law. However, there 
are many different definitions of the principle making it hard to judge its status. 
 
There are a few main interpretations of the principle that are explored in this essay. The first 
interpretation states that it is simply an obligation for states to act in favour of the 
environment even though there is no certain scientific proof of the harmfulness of an activity. 
One interpretation similar to this one is that the principle gives a right to action for a state in 
spite of scientific uncertainty and other obligations. The more extreme interpretations have to 
do with the burden of proof and either suggests a lowered burden of proof, or a reversed one.  
 
Conclusively, it is clear that the precautionary principle now is a prominent feature in 
international environmental law, but that it cannot yet be said exactly what it entails, much 
due to such contrary definitions. 
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Sammanfattning 
I dagens samhälle är det svårt att nå säkra forskningsresultat beträffande hur våra handlingar 
kommer påverka miljön i framtiden. Detta skapar problem i domstolsprocesser då en stat 
måste bevisa att skada kommer ske för att kunna stoppa en potentiellt skadlig handling. Ett 
sätt att lösa detta problem är att tillämpa försiktighetsprincipen, som undersöks i denna 
uppsats. Den mest grundläggande definitionen av principen, som många forskare håller med 
om, är att det krävs lägre beviskrav för att en stat ska handla för att skydda miljön. 
 
De två frågeställningarna i denna uppsats är huruvida försiktighetsprincipen har nått en status 
som juridiskt bindande princip i internationell miljörätt, och vad principen i så fall innehåller. 
I uppsatsen studeras rättsfall och åsikter i doktrin. Resultatet jämförs sedan med de krav som 
ställs i folkrätten för att en princip ska få sedvanerättslig status. 
 
Några av uppsatsens viktigaste slutsatser är att internationella domstolar har varit försiktiga 
med att tillämpa försiktighetsprincipen även om parterna i fallen ofta åberopat den. Vidare 
återfinns principen i en lång rad viktiga traktater vilket styrker principens status i 
internationell miljörätt. Det konstateras även att det finns många olika definitioner av 
principen, vilket försvårar en undersökning av principens status.  
 
I uppsatsen undersöks några av de viktigaste definitionerna av försiktighetsprincipen. Den 
mest basala stadgar att det finns en skyldighet för stater att agera för att förhindra potentiellt 
farlig verksamhet även då det inte säkert går att bevisa att en skada kommer att inträffa. En 
liknande tolkning är att principen kan användas för att ge en stat en rättighet till att handla 
utan säker bevisning och emot andra skyldigheter. De mer extrema tolkningarna involverar 
bevisbörda och antingen en sänkta beviskrav eller en omvänd bevisbörda. 
 
Sammanfattningsvis kan sägas att försiktighetsprincipen numera är en viktig del av den 
internationella miljörätten, men att det är svårt att säga exakt vad den innehåller, mycket på 
grund av att det finns många vitt skilda definitioner.  
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Abbreviations 
1975 Statute The 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay 
 
ARSIWA Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 
 
CARU Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay 
 
EIA        Environmental Impact Assessment 
  
EU        European Union 
 
ICJ        International Court of Justice 
  
ITLOS       International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
 
MEA        Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
 
OSPAR Convention Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the 
north-east Atlantic 
Rio Declaration    The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
 
SPS Agreement The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 
 
Stockholm Declaration The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment 
 
TFEU       Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
VCLT       Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
WTO        World Trade Organisation 
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1. Introduction 
 General remarks 1.1
In today’s society environmental issues have been accepted as something we must attempt to 
solve. The challenge of environmental issues is that it is often hard to predict the 
consequences of one’s acts, and the consequences risk being very grave and in some cases 
irreversible. In short there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the environmental problems we 
face today. One way of solving this challenge could be the use of the precautionary principle, 
which could could lead to a greater responsibility for a state allowing potentially harmful 
activity on its territory through authorising or requiring action to stop the activity even before 
there is scientific evidence of the risk. This means the necessary measures can be imposed 
before it is too late. 
 
The precautionary principle, or precautionary approach as it is often called, is a widely 
discussed topic in the field of international environmental law. There are many uncertainties 
leading to quite a number of questions, which of course means that a large number of people 
have chosen to study it and tried to clarify its status and meaning. Does it actually exist? Is it 
a binding rule of international law? What obligations does the principle in that case impose? 
In 2011 the ICJ judged in a case concerning pulp mills on the bank of the Uruguay River1 and 
while for the first time addressing the principle in question, managed to give rise to an even 
larger number of questions instead of making the situation clear.  
 Aim 1.2
The overall aim of this essay is to examine the status of the precautionary principle in 
international environmental law, with a focus on the situation after the ICJ judgement in the 
Pulp Mills case.  
 Research questions 1.3
Two research questions have been chosen for this essay. The first one is whether the 
precautionary principle has reached the status of a principle of international customary law. 
                                                
1 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 [Hereinafter: Pulp 
  Mills]. 
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The second is what the principle actually entails if it has reached this status. Is it possible that 
the principle exists, but not in the sense that one might originally think?  
 Delimitations 1.4
I have decided on the following delimitations in order to limit the scope of my study. Firstly, 
the issue of the implementation of the principle in national legislation will not be addressed, 
nor will the there be a discussion on the use of the principle in connection with specific areas 
of environmental law. Secondly, the use of the precautionary principle between states as a 
result of bilateral and multilateral treaties2 will not be studied in order to leave more space to 
a deeper study of the principle in customary international law. I have also chosen not to 
examine whether the precautionary principle could be used in other areas of international law 
such as human health protection. Lastly I will not further explore the relationship between the 
precautionary principle and other customary principles e.g. the preventive principle.  
 Methodology and theory 1.5
In the main, the legal dogmatic method has been used while writing this essay. This means 
that an investigation de lege lata is conducted, with the traditional sources of law as a basis. 
In this case, in the context of international law, the focus lies on customary international law, 
general principles of law and in some cases where relevant, also treaties. Of great importance 
are of course also cases from international tribunals.  
 
In some parts of the essay a historical method has also been used, primarily in the 
background chapter, though it is also present in chapter three. To determine the status of a 
principle today one must also look into its historical context, which will be more apparent in 
chapter four, where the requirements for a principle to be a binding one are discussed.  
 
In this essay, the mode of writing is in large parts descriptive, especially in the background 
and chapters three to six. However, the study has of course also analytical elements that are 
most noticeable in the analysis, but also in chapters four to six.  
 
Finally, it is of great interest what effect an application of the precautionary principle would 
have on international environmental law. Therefore a section of a more philosophical nature 
                                                
2 E.g. article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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has been added with different authors’ views on the possible dangers or advantages of the 
principle being part of binding international law. This is rather a discussion of de lege ferenda 
but will in any case be included as to illustrate the possible effects of the precautionary 
principle. This can be found in chapter six.  
 
As the focus of the essay is the status of the precautionary principle today, the essay begins 
with a background chapter on the principle with only a shorter overview of the historical 
context and some possible definitions, this to facilitate the understanding of the principle. 
Thereafter follows an overview of relevant case law, with focus on a few more prominent 
cases that in greater detail have been examined in doctrine along with comments by leading 
researchers in the field. This is followed by a chapter with information on the requirements 
for a principle to become a part of customary international law and by that binding for all 
states. Continuing, the essay will examine the connection between the information above in 
the analysis, finally coming to a conclusive chapter with comments on the principle’s role in 
international environmental law today. 
 Research situation 1.6
As previously mentioned, the precautionary principle attracts a lot of interest due to its  
unpredictable nature. The principle is mentioned in most important books on international 
environmental law and international principles and it has been studied in many scientific 
articles. The most recent ones are often comments on the Pulp mills case, and these articles 
have indeed been very useful sources for this essay. Many studies also focus on the views by 
different international tribunals. For the most prominent see for example “Precautionary Pulp: 
Pulp Mills and the Evolving Dispute between International Tribunals over the Reach of the 
Precautionary Principle” by Daniel Kazhdan and “The Precautionary Principle in General 
International Law: Combating the Babylonian Confusion” by Arie Trouwborst. 
 Materials 1.7
The materials used the most in this essay is case law from international tribunals, most 
notably the Pulp Mills case, but also other judgements from primarily ICJ, WTO and ITLOS. 
The articles mentioned above have also been central for the study as well as the works by 
Trouwborst and de Sadeleer.   
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2. An introduction to the 
precautionary principle 
 Possible definitions 2.1
The precautionary principle is a concept that has gained a lot of attention in, primarily, 
international environmental law lately. Most scholars agree that the essence of the 
precautionary principle is an intention to act in a precautionary manner before there is 
“serious or irreversible”3 damage done to the environment, even though it might be uncertain 
what kind of harm will occur, or if it will at all be done.4  Another common opinion is that the 
principle covers possible damage both inside and outside states’ jurisdictions.5 The challenge 
is to give a legal definition of the principle and point out what legal consequences it has.  
 
While researching the precautionary principle trying to find a good definition, one often 
comes across the one stated in the Rio declaration from 1992.  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.6 
 
The Rio declaration is not a binding treaty but part of what we call “soft law”7 and viewed as 
a recommendation for states.8 When using the precautionary principle one must acknowledge 
the fact that the definition in soft law is only the way it has been formulated in that document, 
and not necessarily an account of the principle in customary international law. What the 
principle contains might therefore differ from the definition stated. One must not, however, 
ignore the fact that some of the principles derived from the declaration have since been 
recognised as customary international law.9  
 
In order to fully understand the precautionary principle one must recognise that the principle 
could have implications not only in the creation of rules, but also in the enforcement. Many 
sources concentrate on only one of the sides, thus not giving a complete account of the 
                                                
3 Article 15 of the Rio declaration. 
4 Trouwborst 2002, p. 15. 
5 Article 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
6 Article 15 The Rio Declaration. 
7 Instruments without legally binding force.  
8 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 16. 
9 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011 p. 34. 
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situation. Furthermore, it is important to note that the principle might on one hand include a 
duty for a state to act in a precautionary way, and on the other hand a right for a state to 
observe precaution.10 
 
The main different propositions to what the precautionary principle actually is, range from 
the more abstract idea of an agreement by states to act in such a way that they are cautious in 
decisions where environmental risks are taken to the perhaps most extreme version where 
there is a reversal in the burden of proof. In addition to these, one might suggest an obligation 
for states to regulate or prohibit activity that might severely harm the environment, also 
without convincing proof of the risk and a reduced burden of proof.11 These propositions will 
be further examined in chapter five below.  
 Different terms for the precautionary principle 2.2
With exception of the term “precautionary principle” one often finds the terms “precautionary 
approach” and “precautionary action” in cases, doctrine and treaties concerning precaution. 
There are no clear definitions of either of them although some interpret “precautionary 
approach” to be less strict than the principle, enabling a more flexible use. Others associate 
the word principle with a status as a legally binding principle of customary law in contrast 
with the approach. Most, however, use the terms interchangeably and this is also the way it 
will be used in this essay, as the aim is to examine the precautionary concept as a whole.12 
 The historical context 2.3
2.3.1 Before the precautionary principle 
It has since the Trail Smelter case13 been quite clear that a state is not allowed to use or 
permit use on its territory that causes harm outside its own territory. This was further 
established in the 1972 Stockholm declaration where the principle of “no harm” was 
introduced.14 In short, the principle prohibits transboundary environmental harm and is an 
accepted binding international principle.15 This principle requires that an “injury is 
                                                
10 Trouwborst 2007, p. 185. 
11 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012, p. 222. 
12 Trouwborst 2002, p. 3-5. 
13 Trail Smelter (US v. Canada), 3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards pp. 1905-1982 (1941) [Hereinafter: 
Trail Smelter]. 
14 Article 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. 
15 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011 p. 40-41. 
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established by clear and convincing evidence”16 but does also include cases where there is an 
established risk for harm to occur.17 The precautionary principle can be seen as a response to 
this as there are situations today where we might seriously harm the environment without first 
being able to obtain the “clear and convincing” evidence needed to prohibit the harmful 
activity.18 
  
Moving on to the creation of rules, the approach adopted was for a rather long time the 
“assimilative capacity approach”, or as it is also called, the “permissive approach”. This 
phenomenon has its foundation in the idea that we can use natural resources as long as we do 
not surpass the carrying capacity of ecosystems.  Thus it is presumed that we can in fact 
know where this limit is and that scientific certainty is possible to achieve. In the event that a 
possible environmental harm cannot be clearly foreseen, imposing preventive measures is 
neither an obligation nor a reason to disregard other obligations following by international 
law. Today we have realised that once a harm is accurately predicted it might be too late, and 
indeed very expensive, to solve the problem.19 
2.3.2 A brief historical overview  
One of the first mentions of a concept resembling the precautionary principle was already 
1969 in Swedish national law where there was a reversal of the burden of proof in cases of 
environmentally hazardous activities already when there was only a risk for the harm to 
occur.20 The principle also has its background in laws prescribing EIAs before executing acts 
that might be harmful for the environment and goals for “no harm” in scientifically uncertain 
situations.21After this, the concept of precaution has been used in numerous MEAs, 
conventions and declarations, also ones of global range.22 Today it can be found in over 60 
multilateral treaties.23 There is no question that the principle is important in environmental 
law, and often invoked in disputes between states. The main questions now are what status it 
has in customary law, if it affects the burden of proof, or has other legal consequences and if 
also other areas of international law, such as human health protection might be affected.24 
                                                
16 Trail Smelter p. 648-736, p. 716. 
17 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011 p. 43. 
18 Trouwborst 2002, p. 19-20. 
19 Trouwborst 2002, p. 18-19. 
20 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 47. 
21 Trouwborst 2002, p. 16 
22 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012, p. 220. 
23 Trouwborst 2007 p. 187. 
24 Trouwborst 2007 p. 185. 
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3. Cases from international courts 
 General comments comments 3.1
A few cases are presented below, which have been chosen because they are considered to 
well represent the opinions set forth by the most significant courts in this issue. It can also be 
noted that disputes in international environmental law do not very often reach courts and 
tribunals, but are settled in other ways. This is due to a number of factors, including large ees 
for legal processing, exceptions in MEAs, and a general view that co-operation and peaceful 
settlements between states better favour the environment. Moreover, state responsibility for 
acts covered by customary law, is only relevant where there is an international wrongful 
activity25, which is quite rare in environmental law. Most courts have been reluctant to use 
the precautionary principle, although it has been invoked26, though there are cases when it has 
been applied or at least mentioned which will be investigated below.  
 The principle in case law from ICJ 3.2
3.2.1 Cases before the Pulp Mills case 
One of the first cases in which the precautionary principle was invoked is probably the 
Nuclear Tests cases from the ICJ.27 These deal with French atmospheric nuclear testing and 
the dispute commenced when New Zeeland and Australia claimed that a state engaging in 
such activities must prove their harmlessness. The case was closed, due to cease in testing by 
France, and then, twenty years later, reopened, only to once again be closed, thus there is no 
ruling by the court and no comment on the precautionary principle in relation to the case.28 
However, there are interesting dissenting opinions maintaining that already in 1995 the 
precautionary principle could have attained the status of a principle of customary 
international law relating to the environment.29 Judge Weeramantry even goes as far as 
stating that the approach containing a reversal of the burden of proof, placing it on the state in 
                                                
25 Articles 1-3 ARSIWA. 
26 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 100. 
27 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 [Hereinafter: Nuclear tests]. 
28 Nuclear Tests para. 65. 
29 E.g. Dissenting Opinion of judge Ad Hoc Palmer, appended to the ICJ’s Order of the 22 September 1995 
concerning the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with paragraph 63 of the Courts 
Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zeeland v France) para 91. 
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favour of the potentially harmful activity “… is sufficiently well established in international 
law for the Court to act upon it.”30 
 
The Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case31 is a well-known judgement from the ICJ. In this case 
Hungary invoked the precautionary principle to legitimise the right to stop works on a dam 
on the Danube and justify a suspension of the treaty governing the project.32 . This is one of 
the times when the principle has been used to form a right for a state instead of a duty.  In 
order to be able to suspend the treaty Hungary had to prove a case of necessity, which 
requires that an “essential interest”33 has been threatened by a “grave and imminent peril”34. 
The court concludes that “the mere apprehension of a possible "peril" could not suffice in that 
respect”35 and that the lack of scientific certainty makes it impossible to prove the existence 
of one. Unfortunately, the court does not refer to the precautionary principle in its judgement.  
3.2.2 The pulp Mills case 
The ICJ settled the Pulp Mills case in April 2010 after several years of conflict between 
Uruguay and Argentina over the construction of pulp mills on the bank of the River 
Uruguay.36 The river is situated between the two states, so a statute37, which governs the use 
of the river, was concluded between the states. Among other provisions, the statute includes a 
duty to inform CARU38 as well as the other party of activities that might harm the river.39 
After an EIA was performed, Uruguay gave a Spanish company permission to construct a 
pulp mill on its territory.  
 
The court admits that general international law should be included in the interpretation of the 
treaty between the states40 and it is on this Argentina bases its argument that the 
precautionary approach should be applicable.  Concerning the effects of the precautionary 
approach Argentina claims ”the burden of proof will be placed on Uruguay for it to establish 
                                                
30 Dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, appended to the ICJ’s Order of the 22 September 1995 concerning 
the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgement of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zeeland v France) p. 348 (64). 
31 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1997. [Hereinafter: Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros]. 
32 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, para. 97. 
33 The environment was considered a possible ”essential interest” in para. 53. 
34 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, para. 50. 
35 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, para. 54. 
36 Pulp Mills para. 25. 
37 The 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay. 
38  The Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay.  
39 Article 7 of the 1975 Statute. 
40 Pulp Mills, para. 64. 
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that the Orion (Botnia) mill will not cause significant damage to the environment”41. The 
court admits that adopting a precautionary approach in the interpretation and application of 
the 1975 statute may be appropriate, though not in the way that it changes the burden of 
proof.42 Regarding the standard of proof it seems to be no lower than usual and the court 
writes that “[…]in the absence of convincing evidence […] the Court is not in a position to 
conclude that Uruguay has breached the provisions of the 1975 Statute.”43 The standpoint by 
the ICJ in this case has been interpreted quite differently in doctrine, which will be further 
examined below.  
 The principle in case law from WTO 3.3
WTO, though not a court used for pure environmental cases, has had an increasing number of 
cases where the precautionary principle was invoked in its dispute settlement bodies.44 Those 
revolve mostly around public health issues, a field quite close to environmental law, which 
unfortunately falls outside the scope of this essay.45 In a well-known case from the WTO 
panel, the EC claimed that the precautionary principle should be used in the assessment of the 
case as a principle of general international law, which revolved around a dispute on trade 
barriers in accordance with the SPS agreement. The United States was against the application 
of the principle and won support by the court which stated that “and that the precautionary 
principle, at least outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits 
authoritative formulation”46. In several cases after this, the court referred to its judgement, 
withstanding that the precautionary principle was not to be considered part of general 
international law in relation to the cases before the court.47 
                                                
41 Pulp Mills para.160. 
42 Pulp Mills para. 164. 
43 Pulp Mills para. 228. 
44 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 92. 
45 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 104. 
46 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135. 
47 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 
March 1999, DSR 1999:I, 277 and Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, 3327. 
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 The principle in case law from ITLOS 3.4
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case48 from ITLOS, there is a quite clear application of the 
precautionary principle. The case involves an experimental fishing programme of the 
southern bluefin tuna by Japan. The fishing programme jeopardises the conservation of the 
stock and therefore other states have complained. The court states that although there is no 
clear scientific evidence measures must be taken to prevent the deterioration of the stock.49 
Also, the involved states directly mention the principle on several occasions throughout the 
judgement, even though the court chooses not to use the term. Judge Laing does in a separate 
opinion comment on the use of a precaution in the judgement. He claims the “precautionary 
principle” is not applied but the “precautionary approach” and interprets this as a more 
flexible version of the principle.50 He also clarifies that the court has not “engaged in an 
explicit reversal of the burden of proof”51.  
 
In the Mox Plant case52 concerning nuclear power station in the United Kingdom, Ireland 
claimed there was a reversal of proof requiring the United Kingdom to set forth evidence 
proving that the plant would not do any harm.53 The court does not comment on the principle, 
but concludes that there is reason to oblige the parties to cooperate with each other and enter 
into consultation with each other.54 Some regard this as a measure of precautionary 
character.55 Lastly, ITLOS does in an advisory opinion state that there is “a trend towards 
making this approach part of customary international law”56 
 
 
                                                
48 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional measures, Order of 27 
August 1999 (ITLOS, cases nos. 3 and 4) [Hereinafter: Southern Bluefin Tuna]. 
49 Southern Bluefin Tuna para. 80. 
50 Separate opinion by judge Laing in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case  para. 19. 
51 Separate opinion by judge Laing in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, para. 21. 
52 The Mox Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional measures, Order of 3 December 2001 (ITLOS 
cases  no. 10 [Hereinafter: Mox Plant]. 
53 Mox Plant, para. 71. 
54 Mox Plant, para. 89. 
55 See e.g. Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012. 
56 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Sea, Advisory opinion, (Seabed disputes chamber of ITLOS, case no. 17), para. 135. 
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4. Binding international principles 
4.1 State sovereignty 
One of the most basic institutes of international law is the sovereignty of states. In the context 
of environmental law this state sovereignty is mainly the right for a state to set forth policies 
and laws concerning natural resources and the environment on its own territory. However it 
also includes the right to be spared violations on its sovereignty from other states.57 In order 
to infringe on another state’s sovereignty there must be clear legal grounds. It has been said 
that “formal sources” like those one can find on a domestic level in the constitution, are not 
available to someone trying to determine the content of international law.58 Thus, there is a 
need to establish the method for deciding which rules are of such dignity as to be used on 
states. In the work by Beyerlin and Marauhn the terms “normative quality” is used when 
principles and rules have steering effects on states’ behaviour59 This is what binding legal 
rules mean throughout this essay. 
 
The statute of the international court of justice states what sources ICJ can use when judging 
in a dispute. This is a good starting point for determining what is actually binding 
international law as it is often considered a recitation of the sources of international law.60 
Article 38 of the statute reads as follows: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if 
the parties agree thereto. 
 
In the following section there will be focus on the international custom as this essay revolves 
around the question if the precautionary principle has reached this status.  
                                                
57 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012, p. 11. 
58 Brownlie 2012, p. 3. 
59 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011 p. 37. 
60 Brownlie 2012, p. 5. 
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4.2 Customary international law 
Customary international law is made up of binding legal rules that can be said to be of special 
importance as they cause obligations for all states independently of the explicit consent of the 
state in question. If an environmental principle attains this status it undoubtedly has the 
potential to greatly influence international environmental law.61 
 
It is hard to establish what actually is customary international law, there is need both prove 
consistent state practice and the presence of opinio juris, which can be seen in the article 38 
(1)(b) of the ICJ statute. Those prerequisites will be further examined below in chapter 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2. 
 
Another dimension of this issue is that a legal rule or principle can have reached the status of 
international customary law in a certain area or context. Most legal scholars now agree that 
the precautionary principle is in fact a customary principle in the context of the EU, even 
though their opinions diverge concerning the principle’s status in a wider perspective.62 As 
previously stated, this will not be further explored in this essay.   
 
Concerning the relation between treaties and customary law it is quite clear that a rule being 
present in a treaty does not prevent it from also being part of customary international law.63 
Here it must be noted though, that all states are not bound by the wording of the declaration 
or convention, but by the essence of the principle. The definition of the principle can be 
clarified by the text in question as this might be one source describing state practice, but it is 
not binding. Also, when you say all states are bound by the principle as present in customary 
law, also the ones adhering to a treaty regulating the matter are. Rules in soft law are often 
precedents to rules later evolving into internationally binding rules.64 In our case, concerning 
the precautionary principle, this is of course important as there is a great number of examples 
of soft law recommending a precautionary approach in the field of environmental law. Most 
notable is of course article 15 in the Rio declaration.  
 
                                                
61 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012 p. 111-112. 
62 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012 p. 228. 
63 Article 38 VCLT. 
64 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012 P. 95. 
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4.2.1 State practice 
State practice is the objective side that needs to be shown for a principle to have the status of 
a customary rule.65 For state practice to reach the requirements to form binding legal rules it 
must be of a certain duration, consistency and generality.66 The sources used to evaluate these 
aspects are quite numerous and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, policy 
statements, comments by governments on drafts produced by the ILC, international and 
national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments and the 
practice of international organs. The different sources, naturally, have different value 
depending on the circumstances.67 It is important to be careful while determining the meaning 
of the source at hand. According to de Sadeleer, the presence of a principle in a convention or 
similar, can in some cases weaken its customary value if it is presented in such a way that it is 
not presumed to be a legally binding principle.68 
 
Concerning the duration of the practice, there is no specified time requirement, but in order to 
prove the consistency and generality of the practice it is of course easier if there has passed 
some time. Turning to consistency, there is no requirement of complete uniformity, though a 
substantial one is necessary. If there are states disagreeing, or simply not stating an opinion 
about the topic, it is hard to know what this means. Perhaps the state does not deem it 
necessary to speak up in the question and perhaps a statement against the rule is the exception 
that proves the rule.69  
4.2.2 Opinio juris 
Opinio juris is the requirement found in the definition in article 38 of the ICJ statute, which 
states that it has to be a practice “accepted as law”. Consequently, this is the subjective side 
showing that the act constituting the state practice was committed with the purpose of 
following legal rules. In other words, the state has to act in this way due to a “sense of legal 
obligation”70. Some writers oppose the necessity of opinio juris, but it is quite clear that the 
majority agree on the matter. The existence of opinio juris is of course hard to prove, though 
in many cases courts choose to accept that there is opinio juris if there is prevailing state 
                                                
65 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 282. 
66 Brownlie 2003, p. 7. 
67 Brownlie 2003, p. 6. 
68 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 314. 
69 Brownlie 2003, p. 7-8. 
70 Brownlie 2003, p. 8. 
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practice along with a clear opinion in doctrine. In some cases, however, courts have chosen to 
demand more extensive evidence of an opinio juris.   
4.3 The principle’s connection to custom 
Arie Trouwborst, an author behind some of the most prominent works in this field, starts a 
chapter on the legal status of the precautionary principle by saying that “… defending the 
position that precautionary action is mandated by a principle of natural law would be as easy 
as falling off a log. “71. And also states that the idea of in dubio pro natura72 is a strong 
argument for adopting regulations including a precautionary approach. This is however not 
enough legal ground today, so there is a need to discuss the precautionary principle’s part of 
customary international law. As this study does not include the materials needed to properly 
research the state practice, this chapter includes a resume of opinions on the matter by 
important authors in doctrine.  
 
In his very profound study of the sources relevant for determining the precautionary 
principle’s status, Trouwborst examines treaties, declarations and action programmes, 
practice of international organisations, general assembly resolutions, international judicial 
decisins and state practice at the domestic level.73 The result found is that there is a 
widespread use of the precautionary principle in the absolute majority of these sources, 
though there are different formulations and definitions of the principle.74 As previously 
mentioned, there need not be absolute conformity, so this result could very well be enough. In 
addition, Trouwborst points out that the cases where states have not acted in conformity with 
the principle has often been regarded as breaches of the rule, further strengthening the 
opinion of the principle being regarded as binding by most states.75 The source that stands out 
is judgements by international courts, as they have on the most part been hesitant to even 
acknowledge the principle. When it comes to state practice, though, the fact that states 
continue to invoke the principle in cases, in spite of the cautiousness by tribunals could speak 
in favour of the principle.76 
 
                                                
71 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 33. 
72 “In doubt, in favour of nature”. 
73 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 63. 
74 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 245. 
75 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 246. 
76 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 248. 
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Concerning opinio juris, the evidentiary difficulty makes it hard to explore properly. One 
argument one comes across while studying doctrine is that the simple fact that the 
precautionary action is referred to in numerous MEAs as a general principle or approach 
which must be followed, is a sign of a belief among states that it is a somewhat finished 
concept which must be followed, because of a legal obligation and not only because ethical or 
moral belief.77 Through this, Trouwborst finds that the precautionary principle has without 
doubt reached the status of a “…general, perhaps even universal custom”78 
 
The issue, however, is seen as more complex by other authors. The presence of the principle 
in many MEAs could, as a matter of fact, be a sign of an opinio juris not in favour of granting 
the principle the status of international customary law. In many cases the principle is only 
referred to as an aim or even inspiration for states bound by the treaty, indicating that it is not 
seen as a binding principle of international law.79 It must, however, also be pointed out that 
exceptions exist such as in the 1992 OSPAR Convention which states that the contracting 
parties “shall apply” the precautionary principle.80  
 
The fact that the precautionary principle is quite new does speak against an acquired status as 
a general principle of customary law. Although there is no specific amount of time required 
for a principle to attain this status, it is crucial that the there has been enough time for state 
practice and opinio juris to have been clearly demonstrated.81  
 
The principles presence in so many MEAs enables a successful argument for a consistent 
state practice supported by opinio juris. Though, due to the uncertainty in the judgements by 
international courts it might still be too early to form an opinion.  In the view of many authors 
all we can know is that is an “emerging rule of customary international environmental law 
that can claim eminent importance”82 Perhaps more time must pass before there can be proof 
of the principle’s status. This is contradicted by de Sadeleer who means that there is sufficient 
state practice and a clear enough opinio juris to be quite certain of the precautionary 
principle’s status as a general principle of customary international law.83 
                                                
77 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 260. 
78 Trouwborst, 2002, p. 284. 
79 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 314. 
80 Article 2.2(a) of the OSPAR Convention. 
81 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 282. 
82 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 56. 
83 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 319. 
 19 
5 Different views on the principle 
5.1 Precaution as an obligation 
Trouwborst does in his works give a definition of the precautionary principle seen as an 
obligation: 
“Whenever, on the basis of the best information available, there are reasonable grounds for 
concern that serious and/or irreversible harm to the environment may occur, effective and 
proportional action to prevent and/or abate this harm must be taken, including in situations of 
scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or probability of the potential harm.”84 
 
This definition has little to do with the procedural side of the principle, but rather regulates 
state action and creation of rules within states. It also reconnects to the idea of action in spite 
of uncertainty.85 Of course, using this interpretation, there is need for scientific research and 
some knowledge, as there need be “reasonable grounds for concern”. However, the scientific 
proof need not prove a certain quantifiable risk.86 This way of seeing the precautionary 
principle is very close to the definition in article 15 of the Rio Declaration, although a 
clarification adding more detail to the concept. 
 
Another view on the principle as an obligation is that it creates a responsibility to carry out 
EIAs before engaging in potentially harmful activities. Some even think this is what ICJ 
means in their judgement in the Pulp Mills case as this is the only concrete effect relating to 
the principle.87  
5.2 Precaution as a justification 
The instances where a state need a legal rule to support it taking environmental measures is 
when the measures are in conflict with another legal obligation. It is in those cases states have 
tried to invoke the precautionary principle as that rule.  Examples of this is the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros case when Hungary wanted to escape obligations derived from a treaty and the 
EC hormones case in which the EC wants to impose trade barriers in conflict with 
international law. In the case of a right for states to take action the definition is according to 
Trouwborst very much like the one he presented for obligations. The difference is that the 
                                                
84 Trouwborst, 2006, p. 159. 
85 Trouwborst, 2007, p. 191. 
86 Trouwborst, 2007, p. 189. 
87 Kazhdan 2011, p. 547. 
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threshold of harm is lower and already significant harm is enough to produce the right to 
action.88 
5.3 The burden of proof 
5.3.1 Intoductory remarks  
Traditionally in international law, a party needs “clear and convincing evidence to fulfil its 
burden of proof.”89 Moreover, the burden of proof in international law generally, in 
accordance with the rule of onus probandi incumbit actori90, lies with the party opposing an 
activity. In this context it means that someone claiming that there is an environmental risk has 
to prove that damage of sufficient magnitude will, or might, occur.91  
 
The burden of proof can be seen in two ways. Firstly there is the so-called “burden of 
production” and secondly the “burden of persuasion”. The burden of production moves back 
and forth between the parties during the dispute, as they have to refute the argument made by 
the other party. An example of this is that when one party proves that a treaty has not been 
suspended in accordance with existing regulations, the burden of production moves to the 
respondent who has to give an acceptable reason for it, for example proving a state of 
necessity. The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, stays with one party throughout the 
whole dispute.92 This is the party that bears the risk when it cannot put forward sufficient 
evidence.93 
5.3.2 Reversed burden of proof 
As briefly mentioned in the background chapter of this essay, the most extensive 
interpretation of the precautionary principle is that it causes a reversal of the burden of proof. 
Those in this opinion claim that the onus should lie on the party wanting to engage in 
potentially harmful activity to prove that there is no such risk.94 
 
Reversals of the burden of proof have been done before, on a domestic, but also international 
level, in other fields of law. One example of this is in EU discrimination law where the 
                                                
88 Trouwborst 2007, p. 188. 
89 See Pulp Mills. 
90 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 
91 Sands, Peel, Fabra and Mackenzie 2012 p. 222. 
92 Ambrus 2012, p. 263. 
93 Ambrus 2012, p. 263. 
94 Trouwborst 2007, p. 187. 
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respondent bears the onus. However, in this case, the burden of proof has been included in a 
directive and does not follow only from a general principle.95 
 
Dr Monika Ambrus, assistant professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, argues that in 
order to be an actual reversal of the burden of proof, it is the burden of persuasion that must 
be put on the respondent already in the beginning of the process.96 Because there is no actual 
shift in the burden of proof per se during the process, she refers to this phenomenon as a 
“special allocation of the burden of proof” 97 which is probably a better definition. 
 
Ambrus acknowledges the fact that there is no evidence of the principle being used as to 
reverse the burden of proof in case law. However, she maintains that it probably should be 
used in this way, by introducing a fairness-based argument, which she claims justifies a 
special allocation.98 The argumentation is based on Franck’s understanding of normative 
fairness99. Some important points mentioned that strengthen the assertion are the difficulty 
for the applicant to gather the evidence compared to the respondent unequal positions and the 
need of effective enforcement of the protection of the environment.100 The author also states 
that compliance with the principle of in dubio pro natura requires that the evidentiary 
situation of the party wanting to protect the environment is facilitated.101 
 
According to Trouwborst, the precautionary principle as it is in customary international law, 
does not contain a reversal of the burden of proof, even though it does in some MEAs and in 
national legislation.102 Though he does admit that in order to meet the needs of effectiveness 
and proportionality a reversal of the burden of proof might be very useful.103 
 
Also when the principle is seen as entailing a special allocation of the burden of proof, it 
could be used by a state wanting to invoke the principle as a right or justification of an action 
such as in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case. This has, however, not had any success in case 
law.  
                                                
95 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on 
sex article 4 (1). 
96 Ambrus 2012, p. 264. 
97 Ambrus 2012, p. 265. 
98 Ambrus 2012, p. 266. 
99 Ambrus 2012, p- 260. 
100 Ambrus 2012, p. 266. 
101 Ambrus 2012, p.168. 
102 Trouwborst 2007, p. 192. 
103 Trouwborst 2007, p. 193. 
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5.3.3 Lowered standard of proof 
Trouwborst, along with many others today, claim that the precautionary principle has not the 
effect of a reversal of the burden of proof, but that of a lowered one.104 In some cases we can 
see a clear evolution of the standard of proof from the one shown in the Trail Smelter case 
where the party claiming an activity is harmful must reach a standard of “clear and 
convincing evidence”.105 
 
A lowered standard of proof does have the effect that the burden of production is more easily 
switched to the party wanting to carry out a potentially harmful activity who then has to 
prove that it has acted in compliance with its obligations. Consequently it would be easier for 
a party to prove its initial argument. An interesting question regarding this is of course what 
standard of proof should be applied in this case. The only thing most people agree on is that 
there can be no absolute certainty of an activities harmlessness, just as it is not possible to 
definitely prove that an activity will irreversibly harm the environment.106  
 
Some authors mean that the judgement in Southern Bluefin Tuna was based on a lowered 
standard of proof, given that Australia and New Zeeland in the end succeeded in their claim 
even though there was scientific uncertainty.107 However, this is difficult to determine 
considering the court did not mention anything about a reversed burden of proof in its 
judgement.108 The court might have concluded that the evidence was, after all, sufficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 Trowborst 2007 p. 192. 
105 Trouwborst 2007, p. 192. 
106 Trouwborst 2007, p. 193. 
107 Southern Bluefin Tuna, para 80. 
108 Kazhdan 2011, p. 536. 
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6 Advantages and disadvantages of 
implementing the precautionary 
principle 
In order to clarify what consequences, positive and negative, an implementation of the 
precautionary principle could have, this chapter will explore some of the arguments often 
heard in the debate.  
 
To begin with, today there is a need to act before we can be completely sure about the 
consequences for the environment. Science today is simply not up to date with the possible 
ways in which we could endanger the environment in the future. According to a great number 
of scholars, adopting the precautionary principle is the only way to adequately protect the 
planet and the environment.109 
 
The traditional way of seeing international environmental law, with a “permissive approach” 
suggests that it is acceptable to perform potentially harmful activities as long as there is no 
clear scientific evidence of the risk. This, of course, is a more tolerant approach to economic 
expansion as we have traditionally seen it. An implementation of the precautionary principle 
would hinder potentially harmful industry, indirectly causing an economic loss for companies 
and states. In the Pulp Mills case, the investment accounted for 3 % of the GDP of Uruguay, 
which makes it easy to understand a reluctance to prevent the realisation of the project. On 
the other hand there are ecological concerns and a possible irreparable loss of natural 
resources, which could lead to even worse problems in the future, including health risks, 
economical loss etc. These could possibly be hindered or at least diminished, could some 
hazardous activities be prohibited.110 In general, the precautionary principle is regarded as 
rather cost-effective, mainly because repairing is often more expensive than preventing.111 
 
Moving on to the definition of the principle as one concerning the burden of proof, 
implementing the precautionary principle would mean that the evidentiary burden was placed 
on a party that often has better access to evidence in the matter.112 Indeed in the Pulp Mills 
                                                
109 Trouwborst 2002, p. 263. 
110 Trouwborst 2006, p. 194. 
111 Trouwborst 2007, p. 193. 
112 Trouwborst 2006, p. 198-199. 
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case there was a mention of the difficulty for Argentina to gather the necessary evidence to 
meet the standard of proof set up, not necessarily because there was none, but perhaps 
because it was not available to them. 
 
An additional reason for switching the burden of proof is the recognition of the fact that the 
parties are often very unequal in the process as it is often private individuals, NGO’s and 
indigenous peoples being wronged by the state.113 Often, however, there is transboundary 
harm and thus a case between states equal power.114 
 
Furthermore, a lowered standard of proof, or a special allocation of it might make states more 
inclined to bring cases concerning harmful activities before international courts and tribunals 
since it could make it easier in succeeding in their argumentation. Furthermore, it would be 
less expensive for an applicant as the evidentiary burden would be placed on the respondent 
who would have to carry out potentially costly investigations of the activities.115 This could 
be positive as more environmental crimes could be prosecuted, but it would also mean an 
increased burden for the courts that already in many cases struggle with too many cases that 
continue for years. 
 
Another perspective is that there can of course never be certainty. The opponents of the 
precautionary principle often argue that no one could ever prove that an activity causes no 
harm. There is, however, probably no need to set the standard of proof so high that complete 
certainty is needed. As Trouwborst puts it “evidence of no harm” can never be achieved, 
unlike “no evidence of harm” which is a more realistic viewpoint.116 
 
 
 
                                                
113 Ambrus 2012, p. 261. 
114 Trouwborst 2006, p. 199. 
115 Kazdhan 2011, p. 547. 
116 Trouwborst 2006, p. 200. 
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7 Analysis 
7.1 The status of the precautionary principle 
What can be concluded from this study is foremost that the precautionary principle seems to 
have much support in legal doctrine. Many authors accept its status as part of customary 
international law, and through that, a legally binding principle for all states. Some of the most 
notable authors of this opinion are Trouwborst and Sadeleer who also have written some of 
the most extensive works on the subject. Where authors do not agree with this view, they 
often state that the principle is well on its way of becoming such a binding legal rule.  
 
In judicial decisions from international courts and tribunals, the message is not as clear. In 
recent judgements, especially the Pulp Mills case, the court does acknowledge the 
precautionary principle as a binding principle that can be applied by a court. The problem is 
that in no judgement is there a clear definition of the principle, or an explanation of how the 
principle was applied in the case. In one way, perhaps the long awaited ICJ judgement where 
the principle was finally mentioned only weakened the status of the principle as its 
significance and content was so vague. On the other hand, the fact that so many states 
continue to invoke the principle when they bring cases before international courts is a sign of 
a clear state practice and perhaps also opinio juris. Many states seem to believe that the 
principle is a legal obligation, and non-compliance with it could be seen as breaches of the 
rule.  
 
When it comes to the question of state practice and opinio juris, it is important to discuss 
what role the different sources play. As stated before, the sources have different values 
depending on the situation. Some sources are of course more relevant in certain areas of law 
for example. When it comes to judgements by international courts it can quite easily be 
argued that they are of great relevance, as this is how the dispute at hand is actually settled. In 
this case, giving the ICJ and WTO judgements a greater importance does strengthen the view 
that the precautionary principle has not yet attained the status of a general customary 
principle. It most, nevertheless, be noted that the situation in environmental law is fairly 
special, as disputes often do not reach international courts and tribunals, but are settled in 
other ways. Perhaps this could be a reason to put less emphasis on the cases from ICJ, WTO 
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and ITLOS. As MEAs and other agreements play a much larger role on the subject, maybe 
they should be seen as more important than judicial decisions in this context.  
 
Furthermore, the uncertainty of what the principle actually entails is an obstacle to 
determining its status. It is true that one can in a convincing way argue the existence of 
satisfactory state practice and opinio juris on the precautionary principle, but when the 
different sources in favour of granting the principle a status as part of international customary 
law seem to refer to different principles, albeit under the same name, is it really a consistent 
state practice?  One could also argue that all different mentions of the precautionary principle 
in doctrine, judicial decisions and MEAs present a highly divergent state practice where most 
of them use different principles in the same situations. 
 
7.2 The implications of the precautionary 
principle 
First, what all sources seem to agree on is that the essence and aim of the precautionary 
principle is to solve the issue that follows with the inability to procure certainty of risk with 
the scientific knowledge we have today. Secondly, it is clear that the principle is a 
manifestation of the in dubio pro natura principle, and an attempt to concretise this in general 
international law. After this there are numerous different meanings on what the principle 
entails, which have been divided into four major groups for the purpose of this essay. 
 
Starting with the burden of proof, in no resented cas has the principle been used by the court 
as a principle reversing the burden of persuasion, though it has often been invoked as such a 
principle by many parties in the disputes. It is clear that the principle is often used in this way 
in domestic law as well as in some MEAs but in doctrine, there is not a large number of 
authors taking this position. One of the exceptions is Dr Monika Ambrus who uses a fairness-
based argumentation , which she claims proves that one could argue that the principle should 
be used in this way. Of course, this gives a good background on the actual use of the 
precautionary principle, but it is hardly an argumentation that could achieve success in a 
dispute before a court. Instead we are referred to the sources stated in the ICJ statute for 
determining the application of the principle which does not very well support this view of the 
principle.  
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The view that the precautionary principle entails a lower standard of proof than the one 
traditionally used in international environmental law seems to have much more support in 
legal doctrine. This is also closer to the frequently cited definition of the principle in article 
15 of the Rio Declaration as this states that it is not acceptable to postpone preventive 
measures due to a lack of scientific certainty. The only way of effectively enforcing this 
seems to be an alleviation of the burden of proof for the applicant. Concerning the judicial 
decisions it seems rational to assume that, when the court does not clearly account for its 
decision on the burden of proof, such as in Southern Bluefin Tuna, it has used the general 
rule for placing the burden of proof. The reason the court judged in favour of Australia and 
New Zeeland could simply be that they presented the evidence necessary to succeed in their 
argumentation.  
 
There is of course always the argument that presenting sufficient evidence is hard for both 
parties in a dispute and many opponents of the principle claim that the evidentiary burden 
would be just as unfair on the other party was it reversed. Thus it is important that both sides 
acknowledge that science cannot give completely certain evidence, for neither side. Therefore 
it is up to the international community to set a reasonable standard of proof and place it on 
the party most suited to bear it.  
 
The definitions set forth by Trouwborst on the precautionary rights and duties of states are 
very substantiated. They also correspond quite well with the definitions in many MEAs and 
seem to have large support in doctrine. The biggest uncertainty is the role of the international 
courts, which do not seem to have completely adhered to this interpretation as of yet. Also the 
fact that there are so many competing interpretations makes Trouwborst’s definitions weaker.  
 
Lastly it can be pointed out that there is no clear view on how the different interpretations 
should be used. What is applicable in the creation of law? What can be invoked in an inter-
state dispute? Are some parts of the principle only applicable on a domestic level? The use of 
different interpretations gives rise to a lot of questions and the need for further clarification 
by international courts seems a necessity in order to come to a conclusion considering what 
the precautionary principle entails.  
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8 Conclusion 
Throughout this essay two main questions have been discussed, the first one being what 
status the precautionary principle has in international environmental law, and the second one 
being what the principle in that case entails. As stated in chapter 6, there are a lot of possible 
consequences, both advantages and disadvantages, of implementing the principle. Thus, it is 
important in environmental law to have good legal ground for the application. 
 
In order to come to a conclusion on these questions, the requirements on a principle for it to 
reach the status of international customary law have been discussed. This was followed by an 
examination of the principle in terms of state practice and opinio juris. The main findings 
were that there are a lot of different definitions of the principle, making it hard to judge its 
status and that at least the more far-reaching definitions of the principle are not supported by 
international tribunals. It is, however, clear that the existence of the principle has attained 
more and more support, and perhaps it is just a matter of time before the precautionary 
principle has a natural place among binding environmental principles.  
 
It is hard for humans to predict what is actually best for the environment, and it is equally 
hard to prioritise among different important interests. However, we need to do our best to 
preserve our planet for coming generations. 
 
Conclusively, as judge Weeramantry said, already in in his separate opinion on the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case: “International environmental law will need to proceed beyond 
weighing the rights and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of individual State 
self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity as a whole.”117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
117  Seprate opinion of judge Weeremantry in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros p. 115 
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